A question of (mis)alignment: Innovation mandates and absorptive capacity routines by Banerjee, A. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Banerjee, A. ORCID: 0000-0001-8961-7223, Lampel, J. and Bhalla, A. (2019). A 
question of (mis)alignment: Innovation mandates and absorptive capacity routines. R&D 
Management, doi: 10.1111/radm.12393 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22819/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/radm.12393
Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, 
University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights 
remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to.
Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, 
educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. 
Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a 
hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is 
not changed in any way. 
City Research Online
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
1 
 
A QUESTION OF (MIS)ALIGNMENT: INNOVATION MANDATES AND ABSORPTIVE 
CAPACITY ROUTINES 
Abstract: Research suggests that effective R&D requires the right combination of inward-looking 
and outward-looking absorptive capacity routines.  However, we do not have an adequate 
understanding of how these routines influence innovative output in R&D units with different 
mandates. In this paper, we argue that adopting an absorptive capacity routine would positively or 
negatively influence the R&D subsidiary’s innovative output, depending on whether the routine is 
aligned or misaligned with the subsidiary’s innovation mandate to ‘exploit’ existing knowledge or 
‘explore’ new knowledge. We test this using data collected from a global packaged-software firm 
with 14 international R&D subsidiaries that implemented six major absorptive capacity routines in the 
period 2000-2010. Our research provides new insights for both scholars and practitioners in R&D 
management, by showing that balancing of absorptive capacity routines should be considered in light 
of innovation mandates of subsidiaries as well as the firm. Our analysis also provides insights on why 
decision-makers may still adopt misaligned routines.     






The purpose of R&D, argue Cohen & Levinthal (1989: 569), is not only to generate innovations, but 
also to develop “the firm's ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the 
environment”. A firm that has these R&D knowledge capabilities can be said to have ‘absorptive 
capacity’ (AC); and according to Cohen & Levinthal (1990) this capacity is both inward-looking: 
acquiring knowledge from inside the organization, and outward-looking: gathering knowledge from 
the wider environment. Building on the routine-based view of capabilities, Lewin, Massini, & Peeters 
(2011) suggest that AC is comprised of routines; and mirroring the distinction between inward-
looking and outward-looking AC, they suggest two distinct types of AC routines (ACR), namely 
internal ACR that acquire knowledge from the internal organizational environmental, and external 
ACR that acquire knowledge from the external organizational environment. 
Research suggests that AC develops in response to organizational innovation requirements. 
These requirements, according March’s (1991: 71) seminal theory of organizational learning, may 
direct the organizational processes towards exploration: search and experimentation activities that 
generate “new possibilities”, or towards exploitation: activities that focus on developing “old 
certainties”. However, March’s (1991) theory also suggests that corporate R&D strategy must avoid 
becoming trapped in one of two extremes: exploitative R&D that exclusively mines the firm’s 
existing knowledge base and past technologies, or explorative R&D that engages in developing 
multiple risky options that often fail to add to new knowledge.   
To avoid this trap of extreme explorative or exploitative R&D, organizations often develop 
‘structural ambidexterity’ wherein separate organizational units are given mandates for either 
exploration or exploitation. Benner & Tushman (2003) argue that a structural ambidexterity solution 
for R&D usually leads top management to mandate R&D units to focus their effort on exploitation – 
pursuing innovation within existing technological trajectories with a view to improving products that 
are already in the firm’s portfolio; or exploration – directing R&D efforts towards creating 
significantly different products, often by accessing new external knowledge.   
3 
 
 In this paper, we argue that in organizations with multiple R&D units, top management will 
often pursue structural ambidexterity by mandating units to be explorative or exploitative. Although 
the mandates instruct R&D units on the type of innovation it should pursue, they do not prescribe in 
detail what the units have to do.  Instead, R&D unit managers are accorded discretion when it comes 
to selecting the processes they think are best for their R&D activities (Ecker, van Triest, & Williams, 
2013). Exercising this discretion, R&D units adopt a range of absorptive capacity routines (ACRs). 
Some ACRs that are selected at the R&D unit level are aligned with the unit’s assigned mandate – 
whether it is explorative and exploitative.  But crucially, because units are not prohibited from 
adopting AC routines that are not aligned with the assigned mandate, units may decide that working 
with other units, or attaining greater efficiency, calls for adopting AC routines that are not aligned 
with their assigned mandate.   
 We examine the performance implications of R&D units adopting AC routines that are 
aligned and not aligned with their corporate mandates. Our main premise, in line with organizational 
alignment perspective, is that a firm’s resources and capabilities must be aligned with its strategy for 
superior performance (Powell, 1992). We build on Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004: 209) argument that 
when it comes to ambidextrous organizations, performance will depend on creating “coherence 
among all patterns of activities in the business unit”. Extending this point further, we argue that 
coherence, and its opposite, incoherence, are useful criteria for predicting the extent to which the 
patterns of activities in ambidextrous organizations can deliver competitive advantage. We therefore 
argue that R&D unit’s adoption of ACRs interacts with its mandate, and that a unit’s innovation 
performance is likely to be stronger when the ACRs are aligned with the mandate, and weaker when 
there is misalignment.  
Our study has three key implications for research on ACRs. First, we provide evidence to 
show that the introduction of ACRs positively influences innovative output in firms. Using Lewin et 
al’s. (2011) typology of internal and external ACRs, our study – to the best of our knowledge – is the 
first to provide evidence that the introduction of ACRs positively influences innovative output. 
Second, we show that ACRs do not work in isolation, but the alignment or misalignment with the 
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R&D mandate of a unit determines the influence of ACRs. Finally, and most significantly, we show 
that instances of misalignment between ACRs and R&D mandates can lead to poorer innovation 
outcomes. Our qualitative data provided further insights on why decision-makers still adopt 
misaligned ACRs.  
ACRs AND R&D PERFORMANCE  
Routine-based View of AC: Building on the stream of literature that views AC as built by 
organizational routines (Zahra & George, 2002), Lewin et al. (2011) propose two distinct types of 
ACRs: Internal and External ACRs. According to Lewin et al. (2011) internal ACRs relate to the 
efficiency of internal communication and sharing of knowledge produced in other units within the 
firm. In contrast, external ACRs target the acquisition of external knowledge that can be useful to the 
organization.  
As is the case with other capabilities, the development of AC based on routines is also path 
dependent: ACRs are strongly influenced by prior problems and opportunities that organizations 
encounter as they search for knowledge (Zahra & George, 2002). Most organizations tackle the path 
dependency issue through structural ambidexterity i.e. they focus R&D efforts in a unit on one type of 
problem more than others. At the same time, because the adoption of new ACRs is ongoing and 
influenced by the innovation targets that R&D units are instructed to pursue – the mix of ACRs in 
R&D units is also likely to vary. Therefore, when top management explicitly instructs R&D units to 
follow an innovation mandate – specifically towards exploitation or exploration (Benner & Tushman, 
2003), the question that arises is what influence would the adoption of ACRs have on the innovative 
output of R&D subsidiaries that have different mandates?   
Influence of adoption of internal ACRs: Adoption of internal ACRs enable organizational units to 
share and access knowledge from other parts of the organization more freely and efficiently (Lewin et 
al., 2011). This may involve setting-up of cross functional teams (Freeman, 1989), establishing 
common development methodologies (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992), and setting up common 
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technological infrastructure and protocols for knowledge management systems (Davenport, David, & 
Beers, 1998).   
Alignment of internal ACRs with exploitative mandate: Exploitation mandates require units to 
develop deep technical understanding of existing products, fill gaps in the product line, and 
incrementally extend products that have an established customer base. This requires R&D units to 
specialize in searching for opportunities near existing products and technological trajectories (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003). Evidence shows that R&D units with experience of exploitation tend to be more 
efficient at further exploitation and develop specialized competencies around existing products 
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). As these units specialize, they become ‘users of knowledge’ from other 
units, which often hand over projects to specialized exploitation units (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
Therefore, to pursue an exploitation R&D mandate these units focus on utilizing internal knowledge. 
Since adoption of internal ACRs enhances the unit’s ability to efficiently use internal knowledge, the 
unit is aligned with its mandate (Powell, 1992). Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 1(a): The adoption of internal ACRs in units with exploitative R&D mandate positively 
correlates with the unit’s innovative output. 
Misalignment of internal ACRs with explorative mandate: In contrast, an explorative mandate 
requires units to search for new technologies and markets. Execution of an exploratory mandate 
requires flexibility, autonomy, and freedom to experiment, all of which point to ambitious search for 
new technologies, building proof-of-concepts and prototypes, and market testing of new products and 
services (He & Wong, 2004).    
Although explorative mandate requires seeking new knowledge that is completely new to the 
firm – and therefore is more likely to be found externally; the unit is also expected to serve as a 
‘provider of knowledge’ to the rest of the organization (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). This means 
that even though adoption of internal ACRs is not aligned with the exploratory objective of the unit, 
internal ACRs are nevertheless essential for the unit to efficiently disseminate the newly acquired 
knowledge to the rest of the organization. For this reason, organizations often insist that all units 
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adopt common internal ACRs, even though such adoption is misaligned with some units’ mandate. 
However, as the adoption of internal ACR is misaligned with the unit’s R&D mandate of exploration 
(Powell, 1992; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004); adoption is likely to come at the cost of excessive 
standardization of processes that will reduce the unit’s ability to capture new external knowledge 
needed for exploration. Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 1(b): The adoption of internal ACRs in units with explorative R&D mandate negatively 
correlates with the unit’s innovative output. 
Influence of adoption of external ACRs: R&D intensive firms often operate in environments where 
new knowledge is constantly being created. To ensure access to the latest knowledge, these firms 
develop external ACRs that are attuned to external knowledge sources (Lewin et al., 2011). The 
external ACRs enable capture of knowledge from external sources, and run the gamut from regular 
interactions that solicit end user feedback, to knowledge gained from long-term co-development of 
new products and services. These ACRs facilitate learning from partners, suppliers, customers and 
research institutes (Von Hippel, 1986).  
Misalignment of external ACRs and exploitative mandate: As discussed, an exploitative mandate 
requires innovating ‘near’ existing products and technologies. The need for efficiency and control in 
such R&D units often leads to clear delivery goals and demands of executing projects within strict 
project management guidelines of time, cost and quality (He & Wong, 2004). While an exploitative 
mandate is aligned with the adoption of internal ACRs, incorporating the R&D mandate into the 
unit’s activities is left to the managers. Local R&D managers may often resist strict implementation of 
only internal ACRs for exploitative R&D because this constrains their unit’s ability to conduct 
explorative research. Managers may therefore want to expand the scope of the exploitative mandate 
by seeking more R&D responsibilities from the headquarters (HQ) (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
For instance, they may argue that satisfying customer demands calls for explorative R&D in their unit, 
or that failure to adopt external ACRs may hurt in the long-run. In contrast, if managers of a unit with 
exploitation mandate adopts external ACRs, they not only run the risk of diverting valuable resources 
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away from current focus areas but also the risk of excessively diversifying the unit’s search scope to 
the determinant of more focused search on exploitative opportunities (Powell, 1992; Taylor & Helfat, 
2009). Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 2(a): The adoption of external ACRs in units with exploitative R&D mandate negatively 
correlates with the unit’s innovative output. 
Alignment of external ACRs and explorative mandate: R&D units that work under an explorative 
mandate are set up to pursue new technological trajectories. This calls for reaching out to the wider 
environment for external knowledge sources that is not available internally (Monteiro & Birkinshaw, 
2016). Adoption of external ACRs facilitates this process (Powell, 1992; Taylor & Helfat, 2009).  
Therefore, we expect:    
Hypothesis 2(b): The adoption of external ACRs in units with explorative R&D mandate positively 
correlates with the unit’s innovative output. 
Based on these four hypotheses we propose the following ‘interaction-model’ of alignment and 
misalignment of ACRs and organizational mandates influence a R&D unit’s innovative output.  
-----------Figure 1---------- 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Research context: Scholars have pointed out that routines that build AC are unique, context specific, 
and embedded in the organization (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). Therefore, to study the impact of 
R&D mandate on the adoption and effectiveness of the same routine we use data from multiple R&D 
subsidiaries of a single large packaged-software firm: SAP, a global packaged software producer. 
Like most large technology firms, R&D at SAP is globalized and managed out of 14 international 
R&D subsidiaries. Our choice of the firm was dictated to some extent by access to top management, 
and the firm’s willingness make internal information available for research. Confining our data to one 
firm limits the generalizability of our findings, but it also has important advantages. To begin with, 
the firm operates in a single global industry i.e. it operates only in the packaged software industry. 
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Consequently, all of SAP’s 14 R&D units, referred to within the company as ‘subsidiaries’ are 
focused on packaged software development and maintenance. We decided to drop the R&D activity at 
the HQ as the R&D was not set up separately, and thus not easily distinguishable from other corporate 
activities. 
Using a single firm ensures that we are studying the same set of internal and external ACRs 
across all units. Therefore, using the subsidiary as our unit of analysis, and a longitudinal design, we 
can observe changes in different subsidiary’s innovation performance as these ACRs are introduced. 
This means that our focus is deeper than previous research in this area as we aim to understand the 
nature and impact of the same ACR in organizational units with different mandates.      
When it comes to allocating R&D investments, in the case of SAP, an overview of the R&D 
strategy reveals that the company essentially had two mandates for R&D investments in line with the 
typology proposed by Benner & Tushman (2003) and developed by scholars such as Sofka, Shehu, & 
de Faria (2014). The R&D investments to subsidiaries are either directed towards extending or 
maintaining existing products and technologies, i.e. an exploitative mandate, or they are directed to 
developing new products and technologies, i.e. an explorative mandate. Conceptually, this is a typical 
case of structural ambidexterity that "entails not only separate structural units for exploration and 
exploitation but also different competencies, systems, incentives, processes, and cultures—each 
internally aligned" (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008: 192). 
Data: We collected in-depth longitudinal data about the implementation of six major ACRs and 
mandates for all 14 global R&D subsidiaries for the period 2000-2010. There were three sources of 
data. First, we conducted detailed semi-structured interviews with 17 senior executives, including the 
executive board member responsible for R&D for the entire organization, the senior vice-president 
heading the R&D centres, five managing directors of different R&D subsidiaries, various vice-
presidents of R&D based at the headquarters as well as from subsidiaries. These executives were 
identified by the senior vice-president heading the R&D centres and collectively they are responsible 
for setting the firm’s R&D strategy. The interviews were conducted in 2010/2011 and further 
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information for clarification was collected in 2013/2014. Second, we were given access to more than 
200 pages of internal reports, and numerous presentations. We also had more than 50 email 
correspondences with various managers clarifying and detailing the evolution of the R&D network 
and the implementation of various internal and externally focused organizational practices. Third, we 
collected all publicly available information about the firm and its subsidiaries. This includes patent 
applications (from European Patent Office (EPO)), acquisition records (from Factiva and SDC 
Platinum), press coverage on external practices (from Factiva) and key announcements like launching 
of new projects or significant investments in R&D (from Factiva).  
Measures: Dependent variable: Subsidiary’s innovative output. We use the count of patent 
applications made by employees of a subsidiary as the innovative output for each subsidiary in each 
year. Patents are regularly used as a measure of a firm’s innovative output because they represent new 
knowledge created by the organizational unit (Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011). Although our use of 
patent application count as a direct measure of innovative output is in line with past studies of 
innovation, we are mindful that in many industries not all R&D leads to patents, and not all inventions 
are patented. In the case of the packaged-software industry, R&D activity and patenting are closely 
aligned, reducing potential measurement bias (Gittelman, 2008).  As in any technology intensive 
industry, patenting in the packaged-software industry is regarded as the grant of a property right to an 
inventor or a group of inventors for an invention. But in this industry, the rate of technical change is 
such that patent applications are considered vital for protecting any idea that is technically useful even 
when their market value is uncertain (Corrocher, Malerba, & Montobbio, 2007). SAP’s approach to 
patenting conforms to this industry practice.  
Independent variables: Count of internal & external ACRs. First, as part of our preliminary 
interview, the senior vice president heading the R&D centres helped us identify an initial list of 
practices that may have had an impact on accessing internal and external knowledge. Then as part of 
our interviews, we asked the executives to single out the most important ‘standard practices’, or 
routines, that had a significant impact on the ability of R&D teams to access internal or external 
sources of knowledge. To control for retrospective biases, we asked the executives to focus on 
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specific parts of the study period and corroborated the responses across interviewees as well as with 
documentary evidence (where available) to precisely track the introduction of the practice and any 
changes thereafter. We identified 3 internal and 3 external practices that were singled out as having 
had significant impact by the management team. Table 1 provides a description of the ACRs and how 
they relate to similar routines discussed in the AC literature. Appendix 1 provides further details about 
these ACRs. In the organizational context these routines are interchangeably called standard operating 
procedures, best practices or simply standard practice.    
We identified the year in which a routine was rolled-out in each subsidiary. In a few cases a 
routine was withdrawn (e.g. withdrawal of the co-location policy) from some locations, while in a few 
cases there was a time lag between the initial roll-out and the full adoption of a routine. These cases 
were identified by managers with specific knowledge of such cases and were excluded from the active 
routine count. Subsequently, we created a record to count the number of active internal and external 
routines for each subsidiary-year.       
------------Table 1----------- 
Exploitative and Explorative Organizational Mandates: Bettis & Prahalad (1995) note that 
the views of top managers, preferably obtained by first-hand interviews, are suitable source of data for 
determining the organizations strategy. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 17 senior 
executives in R&D. The interviews lasted between one-two hours, were recorded and transcribed. At 
least two researchers were present at all interviews. We followed an interview protocol for the semi-
structured interviews. We used the interview text to establish HQ mandate to R&D units. Appendix 2 
lists the key terms and further details we used for coding of the mandate.  We treated subsidiaries 
engaged in ‘blue sky’ projects without anticipated payoff horizon, or product or technology research 
projects that are in an early stage, as following an explorative mandate.  In contrast, we considered 
subsidiaries with relatively more mature and stable projects relating to existing products and 
technology, as following exploitative mandate. Based on our interviews with top managers we coded 
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the mandate for each subsidiary-year as two dichotomous variables i.e. presence of exploitative R&D 
mandate, and presence of explorative R&D mandate. Appendix 3 provides an overview of the data.   
Control variables: We collected data on the following four control variables: Size, 
collaboration with HQ, number of acquisitions and age of the subsidiary. (a) Size: Previous research 
suggests that organizational size strongly influences innovation (Damanpour, 1992). We therefore 
used the size of the subsidiary as a control variable – measured by the average number of employees 
involved in R&D work in each subsidiary-year. Development headcount is a better estimate than 
R&D cost as we found that the average cost per developer in a high cost location (e.g. US or 
Germany) can be up to four times the average cost per developer in a low-cost location. (b) 
Collaboration with the HQ: Many scholars have proposed that a subsidiary’s position and ties with the 
key source of internal knowledge may also influence its access to knowledge and therefore its 
innovative output (Schleimer & Pedersen, 2013). In a multinational R&D Network, the HQ is the 
primary source of internal knowledge and a tradition of collaboration with the HQ is likely to give the 
subsidiary more access to the HQ’s knowledge pool. The collaboration with the HQ was measured as 
the percentage of joint patent applications between the subsidiary and the HQ. A higher percentage of 
joint patent applications indicate a stronger link with the HQ. (c) Number of acquisitions: 
Acquisitions can be a major source of new knowledge in a subsidiary. We count the number instances 
for each subsidiary-year where an acquisition valued over $100 million was integrated. (d) Age of the 
subsidiary: Scholars such as Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida (2000) have suggested that age is a key 
determinant of a unit’s ability to acquire knowledge. Therefore, we control for age, measured as the 
number of years a subsidiary has been operational. 
Methods and analysis: Since our dependent variable is count of patent applications we use a Poisson 
model. This is a better model than a negative binomial model as the fixed effect in those models lies 
in the variance term rather than the mean, making the negative binomial model misleading (Allison & 
Waterman, 2002). Table 3 reports the estimates of a panel Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML) 
Poisson model with fixed effects for the dependent variable. A panel data model within the same 
organization enables us to effectively study variables that change over time but remain the same 
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across subsidiaries. In our model, we assume that something (unobserved) within the subsidiary may 
impact or bias the dependent variables and we need to control for this. A fixed effect model removes 
the effect of those time-invariant characteristics, so we can assess the independent variable’s net 
effect. 
Results: The descriptive statistics and correlation table (Table 2) show that as expected both internal 
and external ACRs are positively correlated with the innovative output of the subsidiaries. Next, we 
find that the control variables - age of the subsidiary, number of acquisitions and the size of the 
subsidiary are all positively correlated with the dependent variable. This supports our choice of 
controls. The correlation table also points to the relative adoption of internal and external ACRs by 
subsidiaries with exploitative and explorative mandates. For instance, we find that subsidiaries with 
an exploitative mandate are more likely to adopt internal AC practices and subsidiaries that have 
explorative R&D mandates are more likely to adopt external ACRs. This suggests that subsidiaries try 
to align ACRs to the mandate. Another interesting observation from the descriptive statistics table is 
that the collaboration with the HQ is positive in subsidiaries with an exploitative R&D mandate 
whereas it is negative in subsidiaries with an explorative mandate.  
-------------Table 2 & 3----------- 
We are specifically concerned with the directionality of the effect i.e. the sign of the 
coefficients. In model 2 of the regression table (Table 3) we find that the introduction of internal and 
external ACRs improves the units’ innovative output. This provides empirical evidence to shows that 
the incidence of technological innovation is positively influenced by the build-up of AC, through the 
introduction of ACRs. Next, we take a closer look at how this impact can be understood as an 
interaction of the ACRs and organizational mandates. In model 3 and 4 we find support for all our 
hypotheses of the interaction model. We find that the influence of the internal ACR is boosted by the 
presence of an exploitative R&D mandate while the introduction of internal ACRs in a unit with an 
explorative mandate negatively influences its innovative output. Similarly, the introduction of external 
ACRs in a unit with an explorative R&D mandate positively influences its innovative output and has a 
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negative influence when the unit has an exploitative R&D mandate. However, in the full model 
(model 5), the results are significant only for the subsidiaries with an exploitative mandate. To ensure 
the validity of our results we obtained additional information from a senior manager from the 
organization who provided further insight that we discuss in the discussion section.       
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Organizational scholars tend to reconcile opposing priorities such as exploration vs exploitation, or 
internal vs external ACRs, by proposing a balancing approach (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tushman & 
O'Reilly, 1996). Conceptually, such a balance can be achieved through various mechanisms most 
notably: punctuated equilibrium i.e. one priority at a time within the same unit (Gersick, 1991), and 
structural equilibrium i.e. specialization of sub-units over time (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2013). This 
paper highlights the underlying dynamics involved in achieving a balance through structural 
equilibrium. In this section, we discuss our findings in the context of ACRs and draw implications for 
AC theory and practitioners involved in R&D management; particularly in organizations that have a 
structural equilibrium approach.     
In our data, there is indication that decision makers try to align ACRs with mandates. This is 
in line with evidence from prior research that shows ACRs are more likely to be adopted when 
managers perceive them to be useful in meeting their R&D objectives. For instance, Allen, Lee, & 
Tushman (1980) found that when organizations pursue incremental innovations in existing products 
and processes, they stand to benefit from adopting good internal knowledge sharing practices. While 
Cardinal (2001), in a study of pharmaceutical firms, found that projects that had an exploratory 
objective were more likely to tap external knowledge sources. This observation is also reflected in our 
interview data. For example, a senior vice president in R&D pointed out the essential role of internal 
ACRs in subsidiaries with exploitative mandates:   
“We have some labs with a pure maintenance focus … [standard X] makes sure that we keep a 
common development standard across this network [of R&D units doing maintenance]” 
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This is also likely to be the case for external ACRs and exploration mandates, as is evident 
from the high correlation between these two variables in table 2. For instance, an R&D subsidiary was 
built with the mission of connecting with external stakeholders in a key market. In this case, external 
ACRs clearly enable this objective and are likely to be encouraged. A development head recounted 
the underlying reasons for setting up a research centre in Silicon Valley as:  
“[A founder of the firm] moved to Palo Alto to set up a lab there … our largest partners were 
American, North America was our biggest market … we wanted to be part of the innovation from the 
Silicon Valley”  
On the other hand, we find that misalignment of internal ACRs and explorative R&D 
mandates can negatively influence innovation outcomes. This is in line with prior studies that show 
internal ACRs can impose strict standards that form barriers to innovation because they run counter to 
the requirements of new product development (Dougherty, 1992). Similarly, in our context, when 
internal ACRs are introduced in subsidiaries with an explorative mandate, managers do not always 
find them useful in meeting their primary objective. However, these internal ACRs are often imposed 
by corporate teams to ensure more effective diffusion of new knowledge throughout the organization. 
As one senior executive at a unit with an explorative mandate points out:  
“I encourage my developers to experiment. There are no rules here. We want to build the latest and 
greatest cutting-edge technology… You will see this in the culture in everything we do. The way we 
work, our workspace, the tools … everything.” He later adds “Our strategy is to innovate on a stable 
core, which means that whatever innovations we bring must complement and not disrupt the core. It is 
very important that the customer’s landscape is not disrupted and that the end-user has a seamless 
experience... We have to follow the same development standards as everyone else.” 
 Therefore, we find that internal ACRs are often adopted in a subsidiary with an explorative 
mandate due to the potential benefits for the rest of the organization – even though it may be 
perceived as ‘bureaucratic’ and may lead to excessive standardization of processes in these 
subsidiaries. We find that decision-makers are cognizant of the wider benefits to the organization even 
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though adoption of internal ACRs may not be aligned with their own immediate exploratory 
objectives. As a development head at a subsidiary with an exploratory mandate compared adopting a 
standard development methodology to the trial and tribulation of learning a common language to 
communicate.    
“… imagine if we were all speaking our own languages … I may have wonderful ideas, but I will not 
be able to tell it to anyone. … So naturally, folks [internally] need a common language first. Without 
this there will only be islands, there will be no real network… But it’s very difficult.”       
Misalignment can also happen when units with an exploitative R&D mandate adopt external 
ACRs. When the mandate of the organizational unit is to exploit existing knowledge, the introduction 
of external ACRs exposes the unit to external knowledge that is new and often unrelated knowledge. 
This expands the knowledge pool available to the unit. But the additional knowledge may lead to an 
excessive diversification of the scope of the unit. In addition, the adoption of external ACRs, 
especially by units with an exploitative mandate, can be costly. It may be one of the reasons why 
decision makers in exploitative units generally avoid investing in such routines.  Nevertheless, in our 
dataset we found that 13 out of 41 exploitative subsidiary-years had at least one active external ACR. 
One explanation of why decision makers in exploitative units adopt ACRs that may cause 
misalignment is provided by institutional theory, which argues that mimetic and normative 
mechanisms may lead to adoption of routines independently of the mandate of the subsidiary 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  As a Managing Director of an R&D centre with an exploitative mandate 
notes:  
“We are here not just because of the cost and talent. We see great opportunities in this location for 
both the market and the partner ecosystem … We want to develop our local ecosystem … [by] 
training partners … [by] training university students”  
Limitations: Our study has several notable limitations. First, our analysis is limited by our decision to 
study the same ACRs across multiple units in one firm. Future studies may seek to compare similar 
routines across a sample of firms. Second, we have assumed that ACRs and mandates have the same 
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magnitude, and are dichotomous (explorative or exploitative). While this greatly facilitates our 
analysis, a study that examines greater variety of ACRs and mandates, at different strengths, should 
provide more nuanced analysis. Finally, as many scholars have noted – the count of patents does not 
capture all innovative output and not all patents have the same potential for commercialization. An 
examination of the impact and quality of inventions would further improve our understanding of this 
effect.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we examine how the R&D mandates that are formulated by top management influence 
the innovative effectiveness of ACRs. We find that while organizations may wish to tailor each R&D 
unit’s ACRs to fit with the unique context in which it operates – the fit is often imperfect, i.e. R&D 
Mandates and the ACRs of the unit that must follow the mandate are often misaligned resulting in 
suboptimal innovation outcomes. This suggests that from the point of view of optimizing innovation 
productivity practitioners may want to consider setting targets and incentives for the firm, as opposed 
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TABLE 1: LIST OF ACRs 
Routine  Nature of 
the routine 





Internal AC A common standard of how the firm aims to innovate, 
produce, and manage products throughout the entire lifecycle 
i.e. from design to maintenance across multiple versions, 
teams and locations. It contains specific guidelines on all 
aspects of development most notably documentation and 
knowledge management, software security, testing and 
production standards.  
 
Standardization of processes to ensure efficiency 
in sharing internal knowledge, interoperability 
and interchangeability across projects. (Kanigel, 




Internal AC A program in which a group of expatriates are sent to a 
location to achieve a specific objective like setting up of a 
new R&D centre, new team, or participate in long-term 
intense development activities.  
Expatriate programs to facilitate internal 
knowledge flows (Chang, Gong, & Peng, 2012; 
Mäkelä, 2007) 
Mandatory setting 
up of cross 
functional teams  
Internal AC The R&D organization had built up teams of specialists who 
were not necessarily part of the core development team. For 
example, specialists in user interface (UI) design or quality 
management were included in an actual development project 
only at the behest of the development head.  
 
Setting up of cross functional teams to promote 
the crosspollination of ideas (Freeman, 1989; 
Sethi, Smith, & Park, 2001; Clark & 
Wheelwright, 1992)  





Program to establish connections with the local developers’ 
community. A local subsidiary organizes events where 
members of the community are invited to participate in 
various activities like showcasing new ideas, demonstration 
of prototypes and products, co-development projects.  
Development of local networks with partner 
organizations, universities and research 
institutions to improve the firm’s ability to learn 








Program of collaboration with local partners in co-
development mode within the research centre.  
Co-development, partnerships, and alliances as 
source of new knowledge for the firm (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Tether, 2002; Joshi & Nerkar, 2011) 
Collaborating with 
local customers  
External 
AC 
Standardized program in which teams of developers work 
with early adopters of technology in the local market. 
Customer engagement and lead user engagement 
programs as source of new opportunities for 





TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
  





15.18 23.78 0 151         
2 Internal ACRs 1.13 0.77 0 3 0.21*        








0.73 0.45 0 1 0.08 -0.08 0.74*** -0.84***     
6 
Age of the 
subsidiary 
6.56 4.51 1 34 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.40*** -0.02 0.15+    
7 
Collaboration 
with HQ  









5.32 3.26 3.91 7.60 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.14 0.32*** -0.18* 0.46*** 0.10 0.32*** 
              
Sample size 14 subsidiaries, 128 subsidiary-year observations        
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1        
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TABLE 3: RESULTS OF A PANEL QML POISSON REGRESSION WITH FIXED EFFECTS FOR SUBSIDIARY’S INNOVATIVE OUTPUT 










mandate Full model 
Exploitation mandate 
 
    -0.67* (0.34)   -0.74 (0.47) 
Exploration mandate 
 
      0.16 (0.34) -0.16 (0.47) 
Internal ACRs 
 
  0.15* (0.06) -0.37*** (0.09) 0.61*** (0.11) -0.49* (0.21) 
External ACRs 
 
  0.40*** (0.07) 1.22*** (0.15) 0.26+ (0.13) 1.31*** (0.26) 
 
Internal ACRs * 
Exploitation mandate H1(a)     1.10*** (0.13)   1.19*** (0.19) 
External ACRs * 
Exploitation mandate H2(a)     -1.09*** (0.17)   -1.12*** (0.22) 
Internal ACR * 
Exploration mandate H1(b)       -0.74*** (0.13) 0.13 (0.20) 
External ACR * 
Exploration mandate H2(b)       0.39* (0.16) -0.08 (0.22) 
Age of the subsidiary 
 
-0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Collaboration with HQ  0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Number of acquisitions  -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 
Size of subsidiary (log of 
headcount) 
 
0.28*** (0.07) 0.30*** (0.07) 0.13+ (0.08) 0.23** (0.08) 0.14+ (0.08) 
Subsidiary FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations  128 128 128 128 128 
Number of subsidiaries  14 14 14 14 14 
Wald Chi2  522.23 550.73 637.54 580.32 638.67 
P > Chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log likelihood  -374.31 -352.71 -304.42 -333.19 -304.14 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, year dummies calculated not shown  




FIG 1: THE INTERACTION OF ACRS AND R&D MANDATES AND ITS INFLUENCE ON 






APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY ROUTINES 
Routine  Nature of 
the routine 





Internal AC The Standard X methodology was rolled-out across all locations in 
the period 2004 – 2006. During this time frame all developers 
underwent training relevant to their role on how to adopt these 
standards. This common development standard is considered to be a 
significant enabler in the globalization of R&D. As one of the 
development heads pointed out -    
“I have teams in Germany, China and India … these standards 
ensure that we are all on the same plane of reference. It ensures that 
all our products are developed to the same highest standards 
wherever its developed” 
 
Standardization of processes to ensure 
efficiency. For example Szulanski (2000) 
notes how the ‘copy exact’ principle is 
used by organizations to leverage 
optimization of processes across different 
units. A standardized development 
methodology is known to create the basis 
for interoperability and interchangeability 
of pieces of large projects (Kanigel, 2005; 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) 
In their review of AC routines Lewin et 
al. (2011) also note that routines that 
share of superior practices and knowledge 
are key internal AC routines. 
Co-location 
programs 
Internal AC A program in which a group of expatriates are sent to a location to 
achieve a specific objective like setting up of a new R&D centre, new 
team, or participate in long-term intense development activities. The 
co-location program is separate from short term travel (which is 
common). As part of this practice the group of developers are given 
long term (usually more than 12 months) expatriate contracts. If more 
than 1% of the employees of a location are on expatriate contracts 
then the host location is said to have an active co-location program.    
The use of practices involving expatriate 
to facilitate internal knowledge flows is 
well documented. (Chang, Gong, & Peng, 
2012; Mäkelä, 2007) 
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Such programs are estimated to be quite expensive for the firm and 
require approval from a board level executive. This routine was 
practiced in a number of locations between the years 2002 – 2007 but 
discontinued in most locations due to cost reasons. A development 
head notes the importance of this initiative in the early stages of 
development of a project –  
“Three [locations] is not a very good number from a coordination 
perspective… they are crying for co-location sessions! They believe 
that co-location would benefit and focus now [early stages]”  
Mandatory setting 
up of cross 
functional teams  
Internal AC The R&D organization introduced mandatory policy of setting up 
cross functional teams as part of a major reorganization. This was 
introduced in 2009 and was subsequently implemented across 
locations in a phased manner. Such routines enable development 
teams to identify new opportunities as they plan and develop as 
opposed to discovering opportunities on completion of development – 
when it might be too late or too expensive to implement. A 
development head pointed this out as -    
“Experts can contribute early on in the development cycle … quality 
managers can work with the developers to fix bugs as they appear … 
[so that] the developer would not do the same error again”  
In the technology management literature 
the internal routines of setting up of cross 
functional teams has been known to 
promote the generation of new ideas 
(Freeman, 1989; Sethi, Smith, & Park, 
2001; Clark & Wheelwright, 1992)  





The programs were first introduced before 2000 and replicated in 
other subsidiaries later. As part of the routines the local subsidiary 
organizes 2-3 day events where members of the community are 
invited to participate in various activities like showcasing new ideas, 
demonstration of prototypes and products, co-development projects 
etc. These events target freelance developers and individuals from 
partners firms and universities.  
Routines that enable the development of 
local networks with partner organizations, 
universities and research institutions are 
known to improve the firm’s ability to 
learn from external knowledge (Koch & 
Strotmann, 2008).  
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This routine not only provides a gateway to establish connections 
with the local developers’ community it also serves as a multiplier. 
For example, the head of a local community development program 
notes –  
“When a partner sees a demo of an exciting new product that was 
developed with another partner, they want to do the same with us… 
[This event] makes our ecosystem grow.” 




The program was practiced in a subsidiary before replicated to others 
as part of a centrally coordinated effort to engage with local partners. 
As part of this routine, developers co-locate to the R&D centre of the 
firm to pursue a common objective. The infrastructure is jointly 
sponsored by the firm and the partners. Before commencing on such 
collaboration, an alliance agreement is signed between the involved 
parties. Partners bring in their expertise and new knowledge into these 
collaborations. The development head of this initiative notes –  
“We and our partners bring the latest generation hardware and 
software [as part of this program] … we hope that this collaboration 
will lead to prototypes that can meet the most pressing challenges and 
opportunities”  
Routines that build different types of long 
term relationships with partners can be a 
source of new knowledge for the firm. 
These routines can be co-development 
relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998) , 
R&D partnerships (Tether, 2002), or 
strategic alliances (Joshi & Nerkar, 2011)  
Collaborating with 
local customers  
External 
AC 
The firm introduced a standardized program in which teams of 
developers from a R&D subsidiary work with early adopters of 
technology in the local market. As part of this initiative developers 
get feedback directly from the end user of the prototype. This often 
leads to fine-tuning of the product’s features, release dates etc. These 
collaborative engagements are usually set up with important long-
term customers and are bound by confidentiality agreements.  
Customers and end-user feedback during the early stages of the 
Customer engagement and lead user 
engagement programs are known to be a 
source of new opportunities for 
innovation. (Foss et al., 2011; Von 
Hippel, 1986, 2009)  
29 
 
product lifecycle can provide valuable insights. For example a 
development head notes that – 
“One of our largest customer wanted [a new application] seamlessly 
integrated with … We set up a project with the customers to prototype 
this new app … now it is a standard feature” 
 




APPENDIX 2: DETAILS OF SUBSIDIARY MANDATES 
Mandate Project attributes Location attributes Typical performance 
indicators  
Typical quotes from executives 
Exploitative  Presence of R&D topics that were 
initially developed in other 
subsidiaries and were subsequently 
relocated. Key terms used in this 
context are hand-over, localization, 
integrations, and building on 
core/stable products, maintenance  
 
These topics were described to have 
strict delivery road maps, 
characterized by long periods of 
knowledge transfer, quality 
management, testing or maintenance. 
The subsidiary was set up 
organically (As opposed to an 
acquisition) and the reasons of 
founding were observed as 
availability of low cost talent 
in large numbers, overlap of 
normal working hours with the 




performance is likely to be 
measured by the following 
metrics: fully loaded cost per 
developer, attrition/ 
turnover, project delivery 
timelines, quality of 
products  
“The entire [Product P] is now 
developed from this location” 
 
Product P is a mature and stable 
product. Its largest market is the 
US. It was conceived and initially 
developed in other subsidiaries and 
the responsibility for future 
incremental releases and 
maintenance was later transferred 
to this subsidiary. 
Explorative  Presence of topics that are at the 
early stages of research, including 
prototyping and market testing. Key 
terms used in this context are next 
generation, design, prototypes, 
demos, future technology. These 
topics also have delivery timelines 
but the focus is more on building the 
‘latest’ and ‘greatest’ products for 
The subsidiary was acquired 
and the reasons for founding 
were observed as presence of 
partners, key customers or 
specific technical experts 
(start-ups) or academic 
research centres.  
Or the subsidiary was 
established despite it relatively 
high cost. Typically, 3 -4 times 
The subsidiary’s 
performance is likely to be 
measured by the following 
metrics: Innovations in the 
development of new 
products, technologies, 
design that generate new 
revenue opportunities, 
product launches.    
“We want to build the latest and 
greatest cutting edge technology” 
The team was working on a new UI 
technology that would be used by 
other teams in the future. 
“We are in investment mode now. 
It’s not revenue generating – yet!” 
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the future rather than sticking to a 
deadline.     
more than exploitative 
subsidiaries.  
Indicates that this project is in an 
early stage of research. 
 
In our study period, while most subsidiary mandates remained same, we observed changes in a few cases. This happened for two reasons. First, due to 
acquisitions that had substantial impact on the subsidiary. For example, a Canadian acquisition that was eight times the size (by headcount) of the existing 
subsidiary led to the introduction of a new mandate. Second, management concluding that changes in the external local environment of the subsidiary 
required mandate change. Modification in a subsidiary’s mandate due to external environment was coded when the firm set up a special program to initiate 
the change. For example, the firm introduced an exploration mandate in the R&D centre in China by announcing a multimillion dollar investment package to 










Mandate Internal ARC 1 Internal ARC 2 Internal ARC 3 External ACR 1 External ACR 2 External ACR 3
Sub 1 2003 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 2003 - 2006 2010 2003 - 2010 - 2003 - 2010
Sub 2 - 2003 - 2010 2004 - 2010 2003 - 2006 2010 - - -
Sub 3 2008 - 2010 2004 - 2007 2004 - 2010 2004 - 2005 2010 - - 2008 - 2010
Sub 4 2003 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 - 2010 2003 - 2010 - 2003 - 2010
Sub 5 2009 - 2010 2003 - 2010 2005 - 2010
2003, 2005 - 2007, 
2010 2009 - 2010 2007 - 2010 2007 - 2010 2008 - 2010
Sub 6 2002 - 2010 - 2006 - 2010 - 2010 - - 2002 - 2010
Sub 7 2000 - 2010 - 2004 - 2010 2000 - 2003 2009 - 2010 - 2000 - 2010 2003 - 2010
Sub 8 2003 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 - 2010 2003 - 2010 2007 - 2010 2003 - 2010
Sub 9 - 2003 - 2010 2004 - 2010 - 2009 - 2010 - - -
Sub 10 2001 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 2001 - 2010
Sub 11 2007 - 2010 2000 - 2010 2004 - 2010 2003 - 2007 2010 2004 - 2010 2007 - 2010 2008 - 2010
Sub 12 2000 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 2006 - 2007 2010 - 2003 - 2010 2000 - 2010
Sub 13 2002 - 2010 2009 - 2010 2005 - 2010 2009 - 2010 2010 2006 - 2010 - 2002 - 2010
Sub 14 2000 - 2010 - 2005 - 2010 2000 - 2010 2010 2000 - 2010 2003 - 2010 2000 - 2010
